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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the rise of cultural economy as a key organising concept over the 2000s. While it has intellectual 
precursors in political economy, sociology and postmodernism, it has been work undertaken in the fields of cultural 
economic geography, creative industries, the culture of service industries and cultural policy where it has come to the 
forefront, particularly around whether we are now in a ‘creative economy’. While work undertaken in cultural studies has 
contributed to these developments, the development of neo-liberalism as a meta-concept in critical theory constitutes a 
substantive barrier to more sustained engagement between cultural studies and economics, as it rests upon a caricature 
of economic discourse. The paper draws upon Michel Foucault’s lectures on neo-liberalism to indicate that there are 
significant problems with the neo-Marxist account hat became hegemonic over the 2000s. The paper concludes by 
identifying areas such as the value of information, the value of networks, motivations for participation in online social 
networks, and the impact of business cycles on cultural sectors as areas of potentially fruitful inter-disciplinary 
engagement around the nature of cultural economy.  
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The Cultural Economy Moment? 
 
The term “cultural economy” has gained considerable intellectual currency over the course of the 2000s.1 We have seen 
edited collections on cultural economy (du Gay and Pryke, 2002), a reader on the subject (Amin and Thrift, 2004), and the 
launch of the Journal of Cultural Economy. Such developments arise in part out of a growing interest among both 
academics and policy-makers in the creative industries (Hartley, 2005) and the associated notion of a creative economy 
(Venturelli, 2005; Scott, 2008a; UNCTAD, 2008). The growing international interest in creative cities and global city-
regions can be connected to such developments (Scott et. al., 2001; Florida, 2002, 2008; Scott, 2008b), as can the rise of 
hybrid fields such as cultural-economic geography (James et. al., 2008). Such developments are also reflective of shifts in 
cultural policy towards conceiving of culture as a resource (Yúdice, 2003), and the rise of economic discourses within arts 
and cultural policy which, in cultural economist David Throsby‟s account, see cultural policy „rescued from its primordial 
past and catapulted to the forefront of the modern forward-looking policy agenda, an essential component in any 
respectable economic policy-maker‟s development strategy‟ (Throsby, 2008: 228). Throsby associates this with a 
reframing of the arts, which are now seen as „part of a wider and more dynamic sphere of economic activity, with links 
through to the information and knowledge economies, fostering creativity, embracing new technologies, and feeding 
innovation‟ (Throsby, 2008: 229).  
 
Cultural Economy: Intellectual Precursors 
While the term „cultural economy‟ does not gain widespread currency until the 2000s, we can identify some significant 
intellectual precursors to such a discourse, which involve a relationship between culture and economy 
2. Herbert Schiller‟s 
pioneering critique of international communications posited a relationship between the rise of the media entertainment 
and information-based industries (what he termed the Entertainment-Communication-Information (ECI) Complex) to the 
centre of the United States economy, and the extension of global media and communication industries, systems and 
ideologies as an instrument of cultural domination on non-Western societies and cultures. Schiller adhered to a vision that 
saw these processes as interconnected over a 30-year period of research and publication (see e.g. Schiller, 1969; 1991).  
 
From a quite different perspective, the sub-branch of economic theory known as cultural economics has sought to extend 
such understandings, although it has had to do so in an environment where it has neither successfully challenged the 
utilitarian assumptions of mainstream neo-classical economics nor built strong bridges to the arts and humanities, often 
leaving it as an applied sub-discipline concerned with assessing the impact of public subsidy to the arts and cultural 
activities. An interesting feature of cultural economics is that, in contrast to the often heated debates in cultural studies and 
related fields about whether one should refer to cultural or creative industries, writers in this field are quite relaxed about 
the label used for these industries (Towse, 2003). The more critical question is how to define what are cultural activities, 
and hence the nature of markets for cultural goods and services. Throsby (2001: 4) proposes a definition of cultural 
activities as being those: 
 
 involving some form of creativity in their production; and  
 concerned with the generation and communication of symbolic meaning; and 
 whose output embodies, at least potentially, some form of intellectual property. 
 
A third and less obvious inspiration for cultural economy discourse was postmodernism, particularly as it was developed 
in the early work of Jean Baudrillard (Poster, 1994). Baudrillard argued that a feature of contemporary capitalism was that 
the distinction between use-value and exchange-value that Marx saw as defining the nature of the commodity form was 
less and less relevant to consumer society where both were subsumed under the more general category of sign-value. 
Rather than moralizing against the inauthentic nature of, say, entertainment at a theme park as a poor substitute for “real” 
culture, Baudrillard instead proposed the “negative strategy” of celebrating the theme park as a simulacrum of the real, or 
the hyper-real of postmodern culture. While the impulse to link Baudrillard to political economy was one that in practice 
not many followed, a notable series of contributions that draw upon Baudrillard‟s insight have been made by Scott Lash 
and John Urry (Lash and Urry, 1989, 1994; see also Lash, 2004). For Lash and Urry, Baudrillard‟s work hints at a series 
of developments – the semiotization of everyday life, reflexive accumulation, and niche consumption leading flexible 
production – whereby it is not the case that culture is being increasingly industrialized, but rather that the whole economy 
is being increasingly culturalized. Their argument that cultural industries „were irretrievably more innovation intensive, 
more design intensive than other industries‟ even in the heyday of mass media (Lash and Urry, 1994: 123) is echoed in 
Yochai Benkler‟s (2006) recent argument that cultural and information-based industries are today at the forefront of what 
he terms social production as they have always been the most difficult to industrialise.  
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A more obvious sociological influence on contemporary theories of cultural economy has been the sociology of culture 
literature, with Pierre Bourdieu‟s work being highly significant here, particularly Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). In positing 
a relationship between cultural consumption and the reproduction of social class relations, and in proposing that this 
occurred at least in part through the denial of “material” concepts such as that of class being relevant to the domains of art 
and culture, Bourdieu established a relationship between the distribution of economic capital and that of cultural capital 
which places socio-economic relations at the heart of considerations of culture. In championing Bourdieu‟s work as a 
contribution to the sociology of culture, Raymond Williams and Nicholas Garnham observed that „the cultural field serves 
as a marker and thus a reinforcer of class relations … [as] a field in which par excellence the struggle is governed by a 
pure logic of difference or distinction … [and] because the creation of art as a special social object and practice … 
objectively depends upon the distance from economic necessity provided by the possession of economic capital‟ 
(Garnham and Williams, 1986: 124).  
 
Finally, there is the work of Nicholas Garnham, whose contribution has been central to British traditions of thinking about 
cultural economy, but whose work has led in two quite distinct and possibly contradictory directions. In general, 
Garnham‟s approach to the political economy of media and culture has been one that insists that the development of 
capitalism has involved the “industrialization of culture”, so that it does not make sense to think in terms of culture as 
superstructural forms (as in theories of ideology, for example), but to instead consider the dynamics of cultural industries 
in terms of the general forms and practices of capitalist commodity production. This in turn shaped Garnham‟s famous 
critique of what he termed the “left-pessimist” approach to cultural policy, with its focus upon residual cultural practices 
and the state-subsidized arts, and the influence that such work would have upon later developments in British cultural 
policy and the development of creative industries (O‟Connor, 2007). Garnham called for a shift in progressive cultural 
policy thinking towards the commercial cultural industries, arguing that „most people‟s cultural needs and aspirations are 
being, for better or worse, supplied by the market as goods and services‟ (Garnham, 1990: 155). At the same time, while 
Garnham was highly critical of non-market allocations of cultural resources which create dependency relations between 
cultural workers and cultural bureaucrats, and was applying techniques of conventional economic analysis to the British 
television industry (Collins et. al., 1987), he was also drawing upon Jurgen Habermas‟s theory of the public sphere to 
establish a different way of dichotomizing the market and non-market sectors of cultural production. This was seen in his 
normative distinction between public service broadcasting – the BBC in the British case – and commercial media, on the 
basis of the former addressing the community as citizens, and the latter dealing with the audience as consumers. While 
Collins (2004) and Jacka (2003) have argued that this normative account of public service broadcasting has provided a 
poor guide to what public broadcasters have done in practice, it has nonetheless instituted a distinction between the citizen 
and the consumer, and the argument that addressing media audiences as consumers was inadequate in comparison to 
addressing them as citizens, that developed a tenacious foothold in media policy debates over the 1990s and 2000s (Flew, 
2006).   
  
Contemporary Theories of Cultural Economy 
In their account of the rise of cultural economic geography, James et. al. (2008) outline five related but distinctive factors 
in the rise of cultural economy thinking in the field of geography: 
1. The cultural turn in the social sciences, that was particularly played out in geography between political-economic 
analyses of the spatial dimensions of global capitalism (e.g. Harvey, 1982; Smith, 1984), and post-structuralist 
challenges to discursive hierarchies that remained unchallenged in such accounts, particularly around „the 
economy‟ and associated categories such as labor, markets, capital etc. (e.g. Gibson-Graham, 2000); 
2. Particular ways in which culture and economy interlock, such as global city-regions being centers of both cultural 
and economic activity (Scott et. al., 2001; Hall, 2001), and the rise of culture-led economic regeneration in post-
industrial cities (Bassett et. al., 2005); 
3. The cultural constitution of economic practice, and the awareness that particularly in the context of economic 
globalization, „cultural‟ factors can mark significant sources of regional differentiation and competitive 
advantage, as seen in debates surrounding clusters and learning regions (Cooke and Lazzeretti, 2008); 
4. Developments in actor-network theory that drew attention to the performative dimensions of „soft capitalism‟, and 
the ways in which it was being increasingly engaged in new business management (Thrift, 1999, 2002); 
5. Debates surrounding the rise of the creative industries, their propensity for clustering and spatial agglomeration 
(Scott, 2008b), and the emerging policy question of whether the provision of cultural and lifestyle amenities was a 
significant factor in attracting the so-called „creative class‟ as incubators of innovation and entrepreneurial 
activities (Florida, 2008).  
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One of the more widely debated manifestations of such developments was the emergence of creative industries, not only 
as a putative industrial sector, but as a concept that could provide a new anchor point for arts, media and cultural policy, 
arts/humanities education and cultural studies research (Hartley, 2005; c.f. Wang, 2004; Poster, 2009). In the ongoing 
debates that have ensued around the creative industries concept, questions have been asked about: the legitimacy of 
claiming creativity as a sui generis category which can be used to distinguish some industries and activities from others 
(Donald, 2004; Schlesinger, 2008); whether creative industries marks an embrace of neo-liberalism and corporate culture 
and forsakes cultural studies traditions of radical critique (Miller, 2009); and whether the cluster of industries associated 
with the concept – which run the gamut from the creative and performing arts to broadcast media to architecture, software 
and games – is too ad hoc and incoherent to make general claims around (Garnham, 2005; O‟Connor, 2007; Galloway and 
Dunlop, 2007).  
 
There is a growing awareness emerging that culture and economy have become increasingly intertwined, which has in 
turn generated three types of responses. The first, associated with neo-Marxists such as Sayer (2008), proposes that while 
the cultural and economic realms increasingly intersect, they need to be considered as analytically separate. To do 
otherwise, for Sayer, risks collapsing the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, or between „cultural norms 
and values regarding actions [which] have, at least in part, a deontological character, according to which actions are seen 
as good or bad in themselves‟, and economic activities and processes which „involve a primarily instrumental orientation; 
they are ultimately a means to an end, satisfying external goals‟ (Sayer, 2008: 52). O‟Connor (2009) develops a similar 
argument in relation to the creative industries, arguing that „the market only recognizes consumer preferences, and is 
indifferent to the specific quality of these‟; as a result, markets „can only satisfy individual wants as they happen to be‟. A 
distinctive set of cultural values therefore needs to inform public provision of cultural goods and services „because they 
are held to raise the general level of people‟s abilities to become better people, living a more autonomous and fulfilled 
life‟ (O‟Connor, 2009: 392). 
 
A second approach draws attention to the increased culturalization of the economy, arguing that the „cultural turn‟ has 
impacted significantly upon how contemporary capitalist economies operate. Cultural studies theorists such as Stuart Hall 
(1988) and Scott Lash and John Urry (1994) developed this line of argument, as has George Yúdice (2003) with his 
concept of culture as resource, arguing that in early 21
st
 century global capitalism „culture is increasingly wielded as a 
resource for both socio-political and economic amelioration, that is, for increased political participation in an era of 
waning political involvement, conflicts over citizenship, and the rise of … “cultural capitalism”‟ (Yúdice, 2003: 9). In 
their founding text on cultural economy, du Gay and Pryke (2002) associated a growing „culturalization of the economy‟ 
with such factors as: 
 
1. The management of culture being increasingly seen as a key to improving organizational performance, 
particularly when there is an alignment between organizational goals and the values and attitudes of those 
working within them; 
2. The rise of the service sector, where the relationship between economic transactions and their performative or 
cultural dimension through interpersonal relations and communicative practices are more overt and visible; 
3. The rise of the cultural or creative industries, and the spread of practices throughout the economy that have their 
genesis in these industries.  
 
Du Gay and Pryke reject the proposition that it is either empirically possible or desirable to distinguish between the 
economic and cultural realms on the basis of categorical distinctions between „instrumentally‟ and „intrinsically‟ oriented 
activities. They follow Max Weber (1978) and Ian Hunter (1988) in arguing that „formally and substantively oriented 
conducts are too contextually specific and historically contingent to allow them to function as a general “means-ends” 
moral discriminator‟ (du Gay and Pryke, 2002: 11). At the same time, the culturalization of the economy raises the 
question, as observed by Don Slater (2002), of whether a greater conceptual awareness of the need to think about culture 
and economy in tandem is being conflated with the different empirical claim that cultural factors have become more 
important in contemporary capitalist economies. 
 
A third and more radical way of conceiving of the culture/economy relationship arises from actor-network theory. Amin 
and Thrift develop a historical perspective on the concept of cultural economy, arguing that „The production, distribution 
and accumulation of resources – loosely the pursuit of prosperity – has always been a cultural performance … [but] with 
the rise of a separate profession of economics and a set of specifically economic knowledges, such performance has either 
been neglected or actively denigrated (Amin and Thrift, 2004: xii). This raises the question of the extent to which the 
separation of culture and economy is as much a product of discourse as an empirical proposition or one arising from 
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different conceptions of norms and values. Actor-network theory, like post-structuralism in the social sciences, draws 
attention to the extent to which all of the key categories of economic theory – markets, industries, goods and services – are 
formed through processes that are simultaneously cultural and economic, as well as being shaped by law, politics, 
regulations and science. To give one example of how this works in practice, Callon et. al. (2004) have argued that one of 
the features of what is sometimes referred to as the “new economy” is that consumers are themselves increasingly invited 
to participate in the processes through which one type of product is differentiated from a seemingly similar one on the 
basis of its perceived “qualities”, but that these qualities do not exist independently of the judgments made by multiple 
agents, including consumers as well as producers, advertisers, marketers, regulators etc 
3
. 
 
Cultural Studies and Economics: Getting Past the Neo-Liberalism Impasse 
A striking feature of the cultural economy debate as it has developed thus far has been the comparative absence of input 
from economists. It has been the case that policy arguments around creative industries have drawn upon claims made by 
economists, and there has been extensive use of economic arguments in cultural policy and arts advocacy. For the most 
part, however, renewed interest in cultural economy has not led to an increased engagement with economics as a 
disciplinary field. Problems exist on both sides here. Economics can appear to people from the critical humanities 
tradition to be unduly abstruse and mathematical, with economists‟ claims to “value-free” knowledge sitting 
uncomfortably with the expectations in cultural studies that its practitioners are actively engaged with questions of social 
change. 
4
Moreover, the considerable influence that economists can have on public policy and advocacy means that they 
can be seen as particularly close to political and economic decision-makers, which can be seen by critics as creating 
pressures for intellectual compromise. 
 
At the same time it can be argued that people in media and cultural studies work with one-dimensional caricatures of what 
economics is and what economists do. Hesmondhalgh (2007) approaches economics as synonymous with the neo-
classical tradition and value-free positivism, which in his view „is not concerned with determining human needs and 
rights, nor with intervening in questions of social justice‟, but rather with „how human wants might be most efficiently 
satisfied‟, and which „equates the well-being of people with their ability to maximize their satisfactions‟ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2007: 30). Miller et. al. (2001) describe the „neo-classical vision of Hollywood‟ as one that „asserts that the supposedly 
neutral mechanism of market competition exchanges materials at costs that ensure the most efficient people are producing, 
and their customers are content‟. In their view this is „bourgeois economics‟ that deliberately mystifies the actual 
processes of contemporary studio film production and distribution, which „as a historical account, it is of no value: the 
rhythms of supply and demand, operating unfettered by states, religions, unions, superstition and fashion, have never 
existed as such‟ (Miller et. al., 2001: 48). 
 
I would argue that the issues here run deeper than evidence of misunderstandings and straw-person arguments. The 
dominant view of economics from the perspective of critical cultural studies is of a discipline with a singular dominant set 
of priorities, which are narrowly focused and lack realism, is one that needs to approach the economics discipline as far 
more homogeneous and less political diverse than it actually is 
5
. The next step, which is the more crucial one, is to argue 
that such economics effectively functions as an ideology, serving dominant economic interests through the mystification 
of social reality. This is most clearly seen with the use of the term neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism has become an all-
pervasive term among critical social theorists in the 2000s. In media and cultural studies, creative industries is frequently 
presented as a neo-liberal project, with Miller referring to „neo-liberal creative industries discourse‟ being promoted by 
„carpet-bagging consultants‟ (Miller, 2009: 188), Freedman linking the UK creative industries policy discourse to „the 
neo-liberalization of media policy‟ (Freedman, 2008: 224), and O‟Connor critiquing „the annexation, through social 
network markets, of the cultural  value of cultural goods to the evolution of the knowledge economy‟ (O‟Connor, 2009: 
389). Elsewhere, we find neo-liberalism presented as driving such seemingly diverse phenomena as the rising popularity 
of Bollywood-style weddings (Kapur, 2009), the prevalence of violence in recent Australian cinema (Stratton, 2009), and 
the financial difficulties of the University of California (Butler, 2009). 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed critique of neo-liberalism 
6
, but some points can be made about 
how the term is used and misused. The most common accounts of neo-liberalism is a neo-Marxist one (e.g. Harvey, 2005; 
Scholte, 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005), which equates its origins with the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US, who were seen to have drawn upon a set of economic doctrines associated with 
the “Chicago School” of economists such as Milton Friedman, as well as ideas emanating from think-tanks such as the 
Institute for Economic Affairs. Neo-liberalism was an explicitly ideological discourse, aiming to reassert the class power 
of business and economic elites in the face of challenges to their power and authority on the domestic and international 
fronts. In the 1990s, neo-liberalism branched out internationally under the guise of globalization and with the support of 
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international institutions associated with the “Washington Consensus”, such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. It also acquired a notionally social democratic form with the “Third Way” ideologies associated with Bill 
Clinton in the US and Tony Blair‟s “New Labour” in the UK. The global financial crisis of 2008 is, by this account, seen 
as the great historical reckoning of neo-liberalism, where the chickens associated with deregulated markets and the 
hegemony of financial capital finally came home to roost. 
 
It is only recently that Michel Foucault‟s account of neo-liberalism, developed in his lectures at the Collège de France in 
1979, and now available under the (slightly misleading) title The Birth of Biopolitics, has become available in English 
(Foucault, 2008; c.f. Gane, 2008; Hindess, 2009 for discussion). It is notable that Foucault does not trace the origins of 
neo-liberal thinking about government to the 1970s, but to the late 18
th
 century, noting that the question of „frugal 
government‟ has its origins in this period. What Foucault terms liberal governmentality does not, as is commonly 
assumed, start with an opposition between the state and the market, but rather with a paradox of government, which is the 
question of what is „too much and too little‟ government (Foucault, 2008: 28). The contribution of the political economists 
to this debate, with Adam Smith as a key historically representative figure, was to consider how the goals associated with 
„reason of state‟ (raison d’Etat) could be achieved more effectively by reducing the level of direct state control over both 
the economy and the society, and instead enabling commercial trade and other forms of interpersonal interaction. The 
concept that trade could generate mutual benefit was also at the core of free trade doctrines that displaced the legacy of 
mercantilism in the international economic sphere, most notably in Great Britain. 
 
What is today referred to as neo-liberalism has its origins, for Foucault, in the immediate aftermath of World War II in 
Germany, where the “Freiberg School” argued that it had been the historic weakness of economic liberalism in Germany 
since the 1840s that created the historical conditions for the catastrophe of Nazism. It is incorrect to read German neo-
liberalism (Ordoliberalism) as anti-democratic, or as simply being on the side of big business, as big business had largely 
supported the Nazis. Instead, it generates a critique of corporatist economic policies which had their strongest 
manifestations in Germany, but which have routinely emerged as a nationalist alternative in Europe to economic 
liberalism. Nor, from Foucault‟s account, can German Ordoliberalism be read simply as a subordination of all aspects of 
society to the market. Working off a Weberian rather than a Marxist problematic, which emphasized the social tensions 
arising from a capitalist market economy, the Ordoliberals were very much concerned with the social environment and 
Vitalpolitik (politics of life), advocating a diverse range of policies from decentralization of cities, support for home 
ownership, encouraging small businesses and small farms, environmental controls and what was described as „shifting the 
centre of gravity of governmental action downwards‟ (Foucault, 2008: 147-148). The German „social market economy‟ 
model can no doubt be critiqued from a variety of angles, but the point is that it is not simply a boilerplate for the account 
of neo-liberalism provided by the current wave of neo-Marxist critics. 
 
Other points can and no doubt will be made about the account of neo-liberalism developed by Foucault in the lectures that 
form The Birth of Biopolitics. I would simply note three that are relevant to current discussions. First, Foucault argues that 
it is impossible to understand capitalism in terms of „the single necessary logic of its economy …determined by the logic 
of capital and its accumulation‟ (Foucault, 2008: 164-165). Rather, capitalism needs to be understood in terms of 
distinctive economic-institutional formations that differ both over time and between countries. German Ordoliberalism is 
different to American neo-liberalism, which in turn have different characteristics to Britain, and to France, and so on. It 
points to the need for concrete institutional analysis that recognizes and works with the continuing significant differences 
between national capitalisms, even in the context of greater economic globalization (Perraton and Clift, 2004). Second, 
critical theorists are characteristically engaged in political debates around competing forms of liberalism, and socialism is 
not – in this account  - the radical negation of liberalism. This is because, for Foucault, liberalism is  less as about being a 
philosophy or an ideology than constituting a set of arts of government and technologies of governmental practice. The 
innovation of neo-liberalism, in this account, is the insertion of concepts of enterprise and competition into all aspects of 
economic and social management, and its historical competitor is Keynesianism – or, more precisely, the mix of demand 
management techniques, economic planning and redistributive taxation and social welfare policies historically linked to 
social democracy – rather than Marxism and its variants. Foucault sees the questions raised by liberal modes of 
government as preventing unavoidable questions for socialists. He argues that what „socialism lacks is not so much a 
theory of the state as a governmental reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would be in socialism. That 
is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, and objectives of governmental action‟ (Foucault, 
2008: 95-96). Finally, the publication of The Birth of Biopolitics may provide more focus on what neo-liberalism actually 
is, rather than it becoming a category prone to analytical hyperinflation since, as Donald Nonini observes in relation to 
debates about whether China is becoming more neo-liberal: 
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The term „neo-liberal‟ has recently appeared so frequently, and been applied with such abandon, that it risks being 
used to refer to almost any political, economic, social or cultural process associated with contemporary capitalism 
… A term with so many meanings obviously has great utility, because most progressive scholars can agree that 
whatever neo-liberalism is, they don‟t like it, and the ambiguity of the term allows discursive coalitions of the 
like-minded to form without the troublesome bother of having to clarify exactly what it is they oppose or are 
critical of (Nonini, 2008: 149). 
  
Opportunities for Collaboration between Cultural Studies and Economics around Cultural Economy 
I will conclude by identifying four areas where scope can be identified for useful collaboration around the concept of 
cultural economy between economic and cultural researchers. The first concerns the value of information. Because 
markets are, by one account, a vast signaling mechanism to various agents that inform decisions, economists have done a 
lot of thinking about information – who has it, how it is distributed, how it is produced, and how it is used (e.g. Shapiro 
and Varian, 1999). The growth of the Internet and the rise of the digital economy has meant an exponential growth in 
amounts of available information and capacities to access them, leading to a proliferation of forms of information-driven 
behavior, such as online auctions on eBay and other related sites (David and Foray, 2002). The question of the value of 
information is also emerging sharply in the present period in debates about the future of news, and plans by commercial 
media proprietors to shift to user-pays forms of access to their online news sites. It also arises in considering the 
contemporary roles and purposes of the university, but noting this draws our attention to the important distinctions 
between information and knowledge, which cannot be resolved within an economic framework that takes as its starting 
point undifferentiated data. More in-depth and interdisciplinary work on the value of information is emerging as a priority. 
 
Second, I would note discussions about the value of networks. Networks are one of the three primary forms of co-
ordination of behavior among agents alongside hierarchies and markets, and there is a general view that their significance 
has increased over the 1990s and 2000s for reasons related to the rise of the Internet and digital media technologies 
(Castells, 1996; Thompson, 2003; Benkler, 2006). Social network analysis has its origins in sociology, but it constitutes a 
major potential field for collaborative research related to the cultural economy. One important feature of sociological 
work around networks is that they can constitute the basis for exclusion as well as inclusion, and that an understanding of 
the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion in the creative industries avoids overly celebratory accounts of what Angela 
McRobbie (2005) terms the work of „selling the self‟ that often characterizes work in these industries.  
 
Recent work on the value of networks has been undertaken by Potts et. al. (2008), which has brought together cultural 
studies with evolutionary and behavioral economics to propose a redefinition of creative industries around the concept of 
social network markets. In this analysis, it is the interaction between agents, social networks and enterprises that primarily 
occurs through markets that enable industries to evolve over time. From this perspective, what is unique about the creative 
industries is that they have consumers who are seeking the use-value of novelty from creative goods and services 
alongside producers who need to experiment and generate a product repertoire in the face of endemic risk and uncertainty 
about consumer demand (Potts et. al., 2008: 171-173). Both producers and consumers will therefore be engaged in 
continuous learning processes about what creative goods and services are available, what their qualities might be, and 
what are the price-points at which decisions to buy and consume these products would be made. As all of these are 
information questions, the value of social networks in generating information and enabling it to be harnessed for purposes 
of producer decision-making and consumer choice becomes central. This recent restatement of creative industries in terms 
of social network markets aims to avoid the problems associated with industry-driven definitions of the creative 
industries, such as boundary dilemmas and the implicit privileging of producer interests over those of consumers, by 
identifying the creative industries as a field characterized by recurring interactions between learning agents, social 
networks and market-based enterprises, organizations and coordinating institutions. This presents the creative industries as 
being engaged in „the representation and coordination of new ideas‟ (Potts et. al., 2008: 176) whose definitional 
boundaries can be expected to shift over time as a result of interactions between learning agents and enterprises in social 
network markets. 
 
A third area of interest is that of motivations for participation and collaboration in online social networks. Economics has 
long been taken to task for routinely underestimating and downplaying the significance of non-market activities and those 
undertaken with non-pecuniary motivations. It is now being argued, most notably by Benkler (2006) that an information-
driven economy with digital technologies at its core places a premium upon non-market activities with non-pecuniary 
motivations, as it values a non-proprietorial approach to information as a metapublic good, with many implications for 
intellectual property, labour markets, the formation and maintenance of networks etc. This debate has been picked up on 
by Australian economists John Quiggin and Jason Potts in what can be termed the altruism/signaling debate (Quiggin and 
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Potts, 2008). Quiggin follows Benkler in arguing that the Internet and innovation through it is fundamentally driven by 
non-market activities with non-commercial motivations (altruism), that this has been the Internet‟s history and its future, 
and that this has wider ramifications for the wider economy and for economics. Potts counters with the proposition that 
much non-pecuniary online behavior can be seen as proto-market rather than non-market in its motivations, as it involves 
a range of signaling behaviors that may have economic pay-offs over a longer-term time horizon. As we are often talking 
here about publicly viewable online activities, such as Facebook profiling and personal blogging, these are activities that 
clearly concern representation as well as information, and should be amenable to cultural economy analytical frameworks. 
 
Finally, there is the relationship of culture to the wider economy, and the particular question of what happens to cultural 
activities and creative industries in periods of economic downturn and recession. It has been a common observation that 
the art boom in countries such as Britain co-evolved with what proved to be an unsustainable hyperinflation of financial 
assets and bonus cultures in the City of London, rewarding, as Alice O‟Keefe argued in her last arts column in the New 
Statesman, to a „contemporary visual art scene [that] has been the most slavishly money-serving, catering as it has done 
exclusively to the rich‟ (O‟Keefe, 2009). For O‟Keefe, this was encouraged by New Labour with its promotion of the 
creative industries as a growth segment of the British economy: „like bankers and stockbrokers, artists were expected to 
prop up the wobbly edifice of consumer capitalism, to generate profit, attract tourists, help Britain market itself as a 
cultural – and therefore financial – "hub”‟(O‟Keefe, 2009).  
 
If this has been the case, then one would expect much of the arts and the creative industries to sink into recessionary 
gloom alongside the financial sector that promoted their unsustainable growth. At its base, this is a claim that these are not 
“real industries”, and that culture remains a residual outcome of developments in the “real” economy. But Andy Pratt, in a 
recent review of possible developments (Pratt, 2009), proposes that this is only one of four possibilities for cultural sectors 
in a recession. Another possibility is that the public sector picks up much of the slack arising from a private sector 
downturn, with cultural activities increasingly driven by public investment that has quite different priorities. A third 
possibility is that we are in a phase of creative destruction, as Joseph Schumpeter referred to business cycles under 
capitalism, and that there will be “green shoots” of new forms of culture driven by new ideas and possibilities, as others 
wither as they prove to be unsustainable. The final possibility that Pratt raises is that as many economists and policy 
makers have not only failed to adequately register the rise and growth of the creative industries, but have failed to 
understand their changing relationship to economy and society. The resilience of the cultural sectors, in this account, 
arises from a wider shift in the relationship between symbolic and material production, so that: 
 
The ways in which economic transactions include, or depend upon, the cultural dimension of their activities to not 
only „add value‟; but to encourage consumers to make the „buy/not buy‟ decision. So, „culture‟ is not simply an 
added extra, or candy floss, it is the main action, and as such cannot be removed from the product easily (Pratt, 
2009: 496). 
 
This paper has considered the rise of cultural economy discourses primarily in terms of whether economics – and 
particularly newer strands of economic theory such as behavioural, evolutionary and institutional economics – can enrich 
the understanding of creative industries and creative economy as it is developing in cultural studies and associated fields. 
What has not been discussed here is the contribution that cultural studies and associated fields can male to advancing 
economic analysis, particularly in understanding culture-related industries and processes. That work will wait for another 
day. What I have sought to indicate there is that there is much potential for collaboration but on the cultural studies side, 
one corollary of such a commitment is that some serious rethinking has to be done in relation to the one-dimensional 
caricature of economic discourse that is found in many influential analyses in the field. This clearly requires, among other 
things, moving beyond the representation of neo-liberalism as an all-consuming zeitgeist whereby the innocent realm that 
is culture is rent asunder by the sinister machinations of economists with ideology on their minds and evil intent in their 
hearts.  
 
                                                 
Notes 
1
 A version of this paper was presented at the “Media Technologies, Community and Everyday Life” symposium, 
organised by the Centre for Everyday Life, School of Media Communications and Culture, Murdoch University, Perth, 
Western Australia, on 2 September, 2009. My thanks to all those who attended and participated, and to Associate 
Professor Terence Lee for arranging the presentation.  
2
 This paper will only refer to influences over the last 40 years. Hartley (2009) has argued the central role of Thorstein 
Veblen to incorporating cultural variables into evolutionary economics, and Amin and Thrift (2004) argue that such 
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influences can also be seen in the work of Adam Smith as well as Georg Simmel. Karl Marx is obviously also a relevant 
figure, albeit one who has been widely criticized for interpreting the relationship largely in terms of a one-way flow from 
the economic „base‟ to the cultural „superstructure‟ (Williams, 1973). 
3
 An example of how an object can be defined through policy discourses can be found with the Internet. In the United 
States, the striking down of the Communications Decency Act in the U.S. Supreme Court was premised upon the idea of 
the Internet being “like print” and therefore subject to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing freedom of 
speech. By contrast, in Australia the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 were extended to the Internet by 
the Howard government in 1997 through an Online Services Amendment, which in effect defines the Internet as being 
“like television” for regulatory purposes. 
4
 This can be seen as a playing out of the debate over positivism in German sociology, with the empiricist tradition 
associated with Sir Karl Popper and others proving to be irreconcilable with the critical theory approach of the “Frankfurt 
School” of cultural Marxists such as Theodor Adorno.  
5
 One of the many indicators of this are the number of recent winners of the Nobel Prize in economics who are notable 
critics of assumptions about markets of the sort that Hesmondhalgh and Miller et. al. believe pervade the discipline. 
George Akerlof, Paul Krugman, Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz would all be notable cases in point. It is worth noting 
that, in the U.S. context, the American Economic Association has been criticized for a preponderance of supporters of the 
Democrats over the Republicans (Klein and Stern, 2006). 
6
 See Flew and Cunningham, 2010 and Flew, 2010 for a further discussion of the limits of neo-liberalism as an analytical 
concept. 
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